

ROUTING

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Monday 26 June 1978

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Monday, 26 June 1978

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The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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USSR: Brezhnev Speaks at Minsk

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[] Soviet President Brezhnev, speaking in Minsk yesterday, called on the West European allies of the US not to let the "deteriorating" international situation affect their relations with Moscow. In appealing for the continuation of "mutual trust" in Europe, Brezhnev made a strong pitch for Moscow's recent proposals at the talks in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions. He also criticized the US for making a high-level "cynical" effort to "play the Chinese card" against the USSR.

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[] Brezhnev's emphasis on the USSR's force reduction proposals at Vienna, which he said "went farther than halfway," suggests that the Soviets may intend to place more stress on this arms control forum should the SALT negotiations remain stalled. It may also reflect the Soviets' unhappiness at the West's relatively restrained reception of their proposals.

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[] The speech was notable for the absence of any reference to SALT, bilateral US-Soviet relations, or Africa, subjects of recent authoritative Soviet pronouncements. Brezhnev's strongest words for the US were directed at US policy concerning China; he characterized this as a "short-sighted and dangerous" policy that the US may "bitterly regret." He stopped short, however, of the harsh warning in the *Pravda* article of 17 June that this policy could, if it led to Sino-US alignment against the USSR, affect future US-Soviet disarmament negotiations.

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[] In an effort to cast Soviet relations with the West Europeans in the best possible light, Brezhnev ignored such problems as Moscow's concern regarding possible West European arms sales to the Chinese and its deteriorating relations with France because of differences over Africa. He held up Soviet relations with West Germany, which he recently visited, as an example of a positive trend.

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[] Brezhnev's attempt to be upbeat about Moscow's relations with Western Europe may in part reflect Soviet concern about the direction of Sino-US relations--a concern that was evident in the 17 June *Pravda* editorial. At the same time, Moscow regards developments in Soviet relations with Western Europe as one of its greatest gains in the detente era. This factor alone would probably be enough to motivate Brezhnev to seek to insulate Soviet - West European relations from being further hurt by developments in other arenas of East-West interplay, such as Africa. []

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NORTH YEMEN: After Assassination

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[] *//North Yemen is calm following the assassination on Saturday of President Ahmad al-Ghashmi. The new four-man Presidential Council, selected from Ghashmi's entourage, is likely to continue his conservative policies.//*

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[] *//North Yemeni officials appear convinced that South Yemen is directly responsible for Ghashmi's death and have broken off relations with Aden.//*

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[REDACTED] North Yemen's new four-man Presidential Council appears to be an interim arrangement for guiding the country until a permanent successor can be agreed upon. The Chairman of the Council, Abd al-Karim al-Arashi, is a conservative who heads Yemen's constituent assembly. The other members of the Council are Prime Minister Abd-al-Aziz Abd-al-Ghani, Chief of Staff Lt. Col. Ali Shayba, and Military Commander of the Taiz District, Major Ali Abdallah Salih. Ghashmi's permanent successors could include at least some members of the current Presidential Council. [REDACTED]

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
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BRIEF

Pakistan

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 General Zia-ul-Haq, the head of Pakistan's martial law regime, announced yesterday that he has given up plans to

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form a government based on political parties. Zia had been trying to form such a government since March, but by early this month it was apparent that few politicians were willing to participate on his terms. They felt Zia's proposals could delay a return to civilian rule.

[redacted] Zia plans to announce a "federal" cabinet on 5 July, the first anniversary of the coup that brought him to power. Such a step would further formalize military rule. Zia made clear that he will continue as Chief Martial Law Administrator, presumably in reaction to speculation that he planned to appoint himself president or prime minister. [redacted]

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